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Bargained-for-Justice: Lessons from the Italians?
Michael Vitiello*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since World War II, many European countries have reformed their criminal
justice systems, often influenced by the United States.1 Many protections found
in the Bill of Rights have worked their way into Western Europe.2 At times, that
has been the result of the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECHR) adoptions
of protections that parallel protections in our Constitution.3
As discussed below, Italy has joined the movement away from an
inquisitorial system toward an adversarial one.4 It did so, in part, because of
prodding from the ECHR when that court found the Italians denied defendants
the right to speedy trials.5 Part of that process was a move toward allowing guilty
pleas.6
For many Americans familiar with bargained-for-justice in the United States,
the idea that the Italians are finally adopting a form of guilty plea may seem hohum. What is the big deal? Indeed, some American scholars defend the United
States’ practice of accepting guilty pleas in exchange for reduced charges or

* Distinguished Professor of Law at University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; University of
Pennsylvania, J.D., 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A., 1969. I want to extend special thanks to Rosemary Deck
and Samantha Huynh for their capable research assistance and to Ms. Deck for her extensive work on the article
footnotes. I also want to thank my colleague Jarrod Wong for inviting me to participate in this symposium. It
was an honor to participate in an event celebrating my colleague Linda Carter’s scholarship and career.
1. William T. Pizzi & Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to Establish an Adversarial Trial System in Italy,
25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 429, 430 (2004).
2. Heinrich Klebes, Membership in International Organizations and National Constitutional Law: A Case
Study of the Law and Practice of the Council of Europe, 1999 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 69, 71
(1999).
3. Id. at 437–38; European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 6, available at http://www.echr.coe.
int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (section I states:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or
part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of
justice.”)
4. Infra Part III.
5. Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 1, at 437–38.
6. Id. at 444–45.
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sentences as a social good.7 Others simply recognize it as a reality of the modern
American criminal justice system.8
But the transformation of Italy’s legal culture is a big deal. This article
focuses on whether that transformation towards a system that looks more like the
United States system is a good thing.
Many Americans are far too quick to assume that our system has it right.
Many are unfamiliar with non-American or at least non-Anglo-American
criminal justice systems, often resulting in unwarranted criticisms of other
judicial systems. The media frenzy surrounding the 2009 Amanda Knox trial in
Italy is emblematic of our lack of understanding of the Italian system.9 This essay
looks back in time to focus on some of the criticisms leveled at the Italian system
during the Knox case.10 It also briefly explores whether that system looks so bad
in retrospect.11
Thereafter, I turn to bargained-for-justice in the United States.12 That section
explores the history of plea-bargaining in the United States,13 and then explores
the philosophical questions surrounding the practice.14 Is there a plausible
justification, other than sheer pragmatics, supporting the practice? I then turn to
serious concerns with the way in which bargained-for-justice works on the
ground, raising concerns about the fairness of a system that may compel an
innocent person to take a plea bargain.15
With that background, I then discuss the Italian system.16 The Italians did not
take naturally to guilty pleas.17 Indeed, acceptance of guilty pleas is contrary to a
number of principles followed by civil law countries.18 After a bumpy start, the
Italian system has begun to increasingly rely on bargained-for-justice.19 After
exploring the theoretical dilemma that bargained-for-justice poses for civil law
judicial systems, that section describes what has happened in Italy over time.20

7. See e.g., CASEY WELCH & JOHN RANDOLPH FULLER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTS: LEGAL PROCESS
218 (Routledge 2013).
8. See e.g., RICHARD QUINNEY, THE SOCIAL REALITY OF CRIME 146 (Transaction Publishers 1970)
(explaining how the criminal justice system relies on plea bargaining for judicial efficiency).
9. Danielle Lenth, Life Liberty, and the Pursuit of Justice: A Comparative Legal Study of the Amanda
Knox Case, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 347, 349 (2013).
10. Infra Part II.
11. Id.
12. Infra Part III.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Infra Part IV.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
AND SOCIAL CONTEXT
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Perhaps not surprisingly, an increasing number of cases are now resolved through
bargained-for-justice.21
In part, this article is descriptive. But as with the Knox case, comparing the
two systems offers a moment for Americans to reflect about what other systems
can teach us and how those kinds of comparisons can remind us of some of the
failings of our criminal justice system.22 Here, I want to make an editorial
comment: some members of the Court, including the late Justice Scalia, and other
members of the rightwing in our country cry foul if, for example, Justice
Kennedy cites European law as somehow relevant to issues before the Court.
What a shame! Openness to competing systems can produce much greater
insights into our system and can help us see profound flaws. Although the game
may be over now that the Italians have started to rely on bargained-for-justice, I
conclude by posing a hopelessly romantic question: would we be better off
emulating the Italian’s resistance to guilty pleas instead of the Italians emulating
us?23
II. LESSONS FROM AMANDA KNOX’S CASE
Think back to 2009 as the Italian government began its prosecution of
Amanda Knox for the murder of her roommate Meredith Kercher.24 The story
had all the markings of a media field day.25 The Italian police arrested a twentyyear-old American college student spending a year abroad in Perugia for the
murdering her British roommate.26 By the time the trial began, the local public
prosecutor developed a theory that the murder occurred during a sordid sex game
gone awry.27
How could the media resist such a story? Unsurprisingly, Italian, British, and
American media covered the proceedings extensively.28 Fairly early on, many
American journalists put the Italian criminal justice system on trial.29
One might be willing to give journalists who are not legally trained a pass in
their assessment of a foreign criminal justice system. But many American legal
scholars, including some very prominent ones, fueled the media assault on the
Italian system.30 American media presented numerous legal experts who argued

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Infra Part V.
Id.
Lenth, supra note 9, at 350.
Id. at 348.
Id at 350–52.
Id. at 348.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 348–50, 353–54.
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that the Italian system was unjust.31 Prominent Columbia law school professor
and scholar George P. Fletcher called the case “a scandal of the first order.”32
Harvard Professor Alan Derschowitz observed the Italian system was “not among
Europe’s most distinguished” and that the eventual guilty verdict was “totally
predictable.”33
Widely circulated criticisms focused on several aspects of the Italian criminal
justice system: the composition of Italian juries (where judges are in a position to
dominate deliberations with jurors); the lack of jury sequestration; the joint trial
of civil and criminal charges arising out of the same facts (whereby the jury
would hear Knox’s confession despite the fact that she did not have counsel
during the interrogation even though it was inadmissible for purposes of the
criminal charges); and, the failure to recognize principles of double jeopardy.34
The clear message was that the United States system has it right and that failing
to adhere to the same rules is likely to produce unjust results.35
Critics increased their volume when Knox and her boyfriend, Rafael
Sollecito, were convicted.36 Some commentators argued the verdict was the result
of anti-American sentiment; that the defense attorneys were too passive during
the trial; and, that excessive pre-trial publicity influenced the verdict.37
An occasional American commentator defended the Italian system.38 Some
suggested that many of the charges leveled against the Italian system were true of
the United States criminal justice system.39 The University of the Pacific Law
Review published a student comment in which Danielle Lenth argued that
Amanda Knox may have been convicted in the United States and that similar
legal issues routinely arise in United States courts.40
Much of the media attention faded after the Italian appellate court ordered
Knox released in 2011.41 She returned to the United States and awaited further
rulings by the Italian courts.42 She also wrote a book about her experience; but by
the time Harpers published the book, the story no longer generated a great deal of
31. Id.
32. Id. at 353–54; see e.g., Liz Robbins, An American in the Italian Wheels of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
5, 2009, 7:24 PM), available at http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/05/an-american-in-the-italian-wheelsof-justice/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (citing law Professor Fletcher referring to the
Knox trial as a “scandal of the first order”).
33. Lenth, supra note 9, at 354; Robbins, supra note 32.
34. Lenth, supra note 9, at 376–77.
35. Id. at 377.
36. Id. at 350, 353–54.
37. Id. at 366; Robbins, supra note 32.
38. Lenth, supra note 9, at 374.
39. Id. at 374.
40. See generally id.
41. Lenth, supra note 9, at 373–74.
42. Elisabetta Povoledo, Amanda Knox Freed After Appeal in Italian Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/04/world/europe/amanda-knox-defends-herself-in-italian-court.html?_r=0 (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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press.43 That may explain why her final vindication in 2015 did not result in
another media frenzy. The Italian Supreme Court wrote an opinion exonerating
her and excoriating the prosecution for bringing the case despite “stunning flaws”
in the evidence.44 While media reported the decision in this country, few legal
experts weighed in on the question.45 An occasional commentator pointed out the
earlier criticism and suggested that the criticisms were overstated.46
Here, I want to be clear that the Italian system no doubt has many flaws. But
many of the criticisms were ill founded, based on a lack of appreciation of the
overall system in place. Thus, under the rules, the jury heard police recount
Knox’s confession to her involvement in Kercher’s death.47 The confession was
relevant to the civil aspect of the case, but because she lacked counsel when the
police took the statement, the jury could not rely on the statement for purposes of
the criminal conviction.48 In an American court, such a rule would be
inappropriate.
Critics failed to point out two aspects of Italian procedure. First, instead of a
case-by-case Miranda-style rule, where the police can legally take a statement
without counsel as long as the defendant waived his right to counsel (and 80% of
all defendants waive counsel in the United States), the Italians have a bright line
rule49—a statement from a suspect without counsel is inadmissible.50 Many
American criminal procedure scholars have given up faith in Miranda because
police so easily circumvent it.51 By comparison, the Italian rule starts to look
good.
Second, and also largely ignored by American critics, is the fact that the
jurors who heard the confession arrived at their verdict along with professional
judges.52 These judges are involved in the deliberations and are obligated to
explain the proper use of evidence.53 Unlike the American system—where one

43. AMANDA KNOX, WAITING TO BE HEARD: A MEMOIR (HarperCollins 2013).
44. Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Amanda Knox Acquitted Because of ‘Stunning Flaws’ in Investigation, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/sep/07/amanda-knox-acquitted-becauseof-stunning-flaws-in-investigation.
45. Lenth, supra note 9, at 374; Andrew Gumbel, Trial by Osmosis: Amanda Knox, Raffaele Sollecito and
the Nightmare of Italian Justice, Los Angeles Review of Books (Feb. 11, 2014).
46. Id. I could not find a mea culpa from any of the nationally recognized experts who were so sharp in
their judgment of the Italian system.
47. Lenth, supra note 9, at 357; John Hooper, Was There a Plot to Murder Meredith?, THE GUARDIAN
(Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/05/meredith-kercher-murder-trial.
48. Lenth, supra note 9, at 357; Gumbel, supra note 45.
49. Lenth, supra note 9, at 362–63; Gumbel, supra note 45.
50. Lenth, supra note 9, at 357; Gumbel, supra note 45.
51. See e.g., Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1519, 1521 (2008).
52. Lenth, supra note 9, at 254, 357.
53. Julia Grace Mirabella, Scales of Justice: Assessing Italian Criminal Procedure Through the Amanda
Knox Trial, 30 B. U. INT’L L. J. 229, 236 (2012).
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has to guess what went on jury deliberations—the Italian system requires the
judges to produce a detailed opinion justifying the verdict.54
Finally and most importantly, why might an American who was critical
about the Italian system before Knox’s release remain silent today? Knox got her
freedom because appellate review of facts is de novo in Italy.55 In the United
States, an appellant has virtually no ability to challenge factual findings as long
as they pass some minimal threshold of reliability.56 Knox won both in her first
appeal and eventually in the Italian Supreme Court because those courts
reexamined the evidence and found it wanting.57 Many lawyers in the United
States who have worked on cases involving innocent defendants should envy
such a system. As Ms. Lenth concluded, commentators should replace “hostile,
biased comparison with reasoned research and understanding of the [other’s]
judicial system before speaking to that system’s flaws.”58
I offer this discussion as a cautionary tale as I turn attention to bargained-forjustice in Italy and the United States.
III. BARGAINED-FOR-JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
Bargained-for-justice has supporters.59 Proponents point to several reasons
why a person pleading guilty should receive a lesser sentence than one who
forces the state to trial.60 For example, the person who pleads guilty has
acknowledged his guilt and a willingness to accept responsibility for his
conduct.61 The plea agreement may have spared the victim the trauma of
testifying in public—most notably, for example, in a case of sexual assault or
rape.62 The plea may help the prosecution pursue other offenders engaged in
more serious crimes.63 Even Judge David Bazelon, a leading liberal during his
time on the D.C. Circuit, explained why a person who pleads guilty may rightly

54. Id.
55. Id. at 253–55.
56. Id.
57. Id.; Matt Schiavenza, Amanda Knox’s Ordeal is Finally Over, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2015),
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/amanda-knox-goes-free/388952/ (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
58. Lenth, supra note 9, at 382 (emphasis added).
59. QUINNEY, supra note 8.
60. Id.
61. See e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970) (“The State to some degree encourages
pleas of guilty at every important step in the criminal process. For some people, their breach of a State’s law is
alone sufficient reason for surrendering themselves and accepting punishment”).
62. See RONEL ET. AL, TRENDS AND ISSUES IN VICTIMOLOGY 167 (2008) (“Sometimes, it is actually
desire to save the victim from the need to testifyCa consideration that frequently arises in sexual offense casesC
that is a significant factor in the decision to sign a plea bargain.”)
63. See e.g. Donald A. Dripps, Guilt, Innocence, and Due Process of Plea Bargaining, WM. & MARY L.
REV., (Forthcoming San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 16-202), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2674852
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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receive a lesser sentence than an offender who forces the state to take the case to
trial: “[T]he critical distinction is that the price [a person who goes to trial] has
paid is not one imposed by the state to discourage others from a similar exercise
of their rights, but rather one encountered by those who gamble and lose.”64
Some supporters of bargained-for-justice have also argued that pleabargaining is part of our history. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Bryan v. United
States, “Plea bargains have accompanied the whole history of this nation’s
criminal jurisprudence.”65 One scholar suggested that plea-bargaining dates back
to Cain and Abel, where Cain pled to a lesser charge than murder.66 However,
according to Professor Alschuler, that is simply not the case.67
Plea-bargaining entered American law only at the end of the 19th and
beginning of the 20th century.68 Bargaining grew dramatically in big cities and
was often the product of corrupt lawyers and judges.69 In the early part of the
20th century, a New York lawyer working with a magistrate would “stand out on
the street in front of the Night Court and dicker away sentences. . . .”70 In Cook
County, Illinois, especially, “fixers,” minor political figures, arranged plea
bargains.71 Many prominent commentators at the time saw the practice as suspect
and corrupt. The President of the Chicago Crime Commission called for the
removal of judges from the bench because they reduced felony charges to
misdemeanors in exchange for guilty pleas.72 Both Dean Wigmore and Dean
Pound criticized the practice.73 The Chicago Tribune stated that the plea
bargaining system was an “incompetent, inefficient, and lazy method of
administering justice.”74
By the late 1960s, a report by a committee of the American Bar Association
(ABA) Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice and the President’s
commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice found that
guilty pleas were “of considerable value”75 if properly administered. Less than a
decade earlier, the Supreme Court seemed ready to outlaw the practice.76 In
Shelton v. United States, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit held that pleabargaining was unlawful stating, “[j]ustice and liberty are not the subjects of

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Scott v. US, 419 F.2d 264, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Bryan v. United States, 492 F.2d 775, 780 (5th Cir. 1974).
Newman, Reshape the Deal, TRIAL, May–June 1973, at 11.
See generally Albert Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1979).
Id.
Id. at 24–26.
Id. at 24
Id. at 25.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 35.
Id.
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bargaining and barter.”77 An en banc panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed.78 The
Supreme Court granted review, but then dismissed when the Solicitor General
took the unusual step of confessing error.79 Professor Alschuler argued that the
Solicitor General’s unusual action demonstrated a desire to avoid the legal
issue.80 Today, the idea that the Court would find plea-bargaining
unconstitutional is inconceivable,81 as it is so deeply ingrained in our system.
Ironically, the increasing acceptance of plea bargaining occurred as the
Warren Court expanded procedural rights at a time when the Court seemed intent
on leveling the playing field for criminal defendants.82 Viewed theoretically,
however, plea bargaining fits into the concept of an adversarial system because a
represented defendant who engages in a plea bargain is making an informed
decision to waive his constitutional rights.83
In the decades after Shelton, the Court imposed some restrictions on guilty
pleas.84 State courts and bar associations also weighed in and pushed for reforms
to make plea-bargaining less suspect.85 But plea bargaining still has many
critics.86
Prosecutors have virtually unreviewable discretion in charging defendants,87
and thus, they have incentive to overcharge.88 They can bargain by agreeing to
reduce the charge from a felony to a misdemeanor.89 Alternatively, prosecutors
may agree to recommend a particular sentence.90 In the latter instance, if the

77. Id. at 35–37.
78. Id.; Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957), rev’d per curiam on confession of error,
356 U.S. 26 (1958).
79. Alschuler, supra note 67, at 35–37.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 40.
82. Yale Kamisar, A Rejoinder to Professor Schauer’s Commentary, 88 WASH. L. REV. 172, 183 (2013).
83. Malcolm M. Feeley, Plea Bargaining and the Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST. SYS. J. 338,
338–40 (1982), available at http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/1559 (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (“[T]he opportunity for adversariness has expanded in direct proportion to, and perhaps as
a result of, the growth of plea bargaining.”); cf. Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining [in italics], 39
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. [small caps] 1121, 1124 (1997-1998).
84. See generally, Kevin O’Brien, Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court: The Limits of Due Process
and Substantive Justice, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109 (1981).
85. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652, 658 (1981).
86. See, e.g, Tina Wan, The Unnecessary Evil of Plea Bargaining: An Unconstitutional Conditions
Problem and a Not-So-Least Restrictive Alternative, 17 REV. L. SOC. JUSTICE 33 (2007); Tim Lynch, The
Devil’s Bargain: How Plea Agreements, Never Contemplated by the Framers, Undermine Justice, CATO (July
2011), available at http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/devils-bargain-how-plea-agreements-nevercontemplated-framers-undermine-justice (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
87. Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and Discretion in the Charging Function, 62
HASTINGS L. J. 1259, 1260 (2011).
88. Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. L. J. 701, 701 (2014).
89. Id. at 704.
90. JOAN E. JACOBY AND EDWARD C. RATLEDGE, THE POWER OF THE PROSECUTOR: GATEKEEPERS OF
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 108 (Praeger 2016).
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court does not honor the agreement, the defendant may withdraw the plea.91
Because charging decisions are largely beyond judicial review, prosecutors may
favor that form of bargaining since it creates greater certainty. Not surprisingly,
over 90% of all criminal cases result in guilty pleas.92
Professor Donald Dripps analogizes plea-bargaining to coercive threats akin
to torture.93 Thus, the prosecutor may make an offer that is such a serious threat
that the offer is “worse than torture.”94 For example, prosecutors typically offer
reduced sentences in exchange for guilty pleas, requiring defendants to quickly
decide between admitting guilt or facing the possibility of 40 years in prison.95
Like Professor Dripps, many believe prosecutors have too much power in the
administration of criminal justice. Increased sentences and mandatory minimum
sentences have given prosecutors so much power that “[c]harge selection, in a
great many cases, is not the beginning of an adversarial process, but the outcome
of the case, practically speaking.”96
One might expect judges to limit that exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
But case law imposes few limitations. Most decisions made within a prosecutor’s
office lack any transparency.97 As long as prosecutors demonstrate that some
facts support the charges, courts exercise virtually no supervision over charging
decisions.98 And those charging decisions may wildly differ depending on the
exercise of the prosecutor’s discretion: consider the options that the prosecutor
had in Lockyer v. Andrade, a case involving California’s three-strikes law.99
Police twice arrested Andrade for shoplifting videotapes.100 Under California
law, a prosecutor may charge petty theft with a prior as a misdemeanor or a
felony.101 Had the prosecutor charged Andrade with one count petty theft, the
sentence might have been six months in jail.102 And the prosecutor could have
charged Andrade with two counts of petty theft, leaving open the possibility of a
sentence up to a year.103 Or he could have charged Andrade with felony theft,
with a possible sentence of one to three years in prison.104 Because Andrade had

91. Id. at 104.
92. Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 1, at 445.
93. Dripps, supra note 63.
94. Id. at 2.
95. See e.g., id. at 2.
96. Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).
97. Cf. id. at 2.
98. Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26 STAN. L & POL’Y REV. 61 (2015).
99. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 68 (2003).
100. Andrade v. Att’y Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 2001).
101. Id. at 749 (“Prosecutors have discretion to charge petty theft with a prior as either a misdemeanor or
a felony, and the trial court has reviewable discretion to reduce this charge to a misdemeanor at the time of
sentencing.”).
102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 484-502.9 (2016).
103. Id.
104. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 18, 666 (2016).
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two prior strikes, the prosecutor could have charged Andrade with a count under
the three-strikes law, requiring a sentence of 25 years to life (without reduction of
the mandatory minimum of 25 years in prison), based on one count of felony
theft.105 Or the prosecutor could have charged—as the prosecutor did—two
counts under the three-strikes law.106 As a result, upon conviction, Andrade was
subject to a sentence of 50 years to life.107
While I have written about three-strikes and the Andrade case,108 I do not
know whether the prosecutor offered a plea deal or not. My guess is, because the
case arose in 1995, in the early days of the law, the prosecutor did not offer a
plea. During that period, prosecutors charged third-strikes in cases that ended up
shocking the public.109 I use the example here to demonstrate the enormous
power that prosecutors have. While the Supreme Court of California has found
that judges have the power to “strike” a “strike” under the law,110 judges exercise
that authority sparingly.111
Similar examples are readily available. Professor Dripps cites a case that
went to the United States Supreme Court, dealing with life-without-parole
sentences for juvenile offenders.112 The juvenile offender in that case pled guilty
to an earlier charge than the one that earned him a true life sentence.113 As
Professor Dripps points out, when the juvenile accepted the original “so-called
bargain,” “[t]he gap between the prosecutor’s plea offer and trial threat was the
difference between little more than time served and a life sentence . . . .”114
One of the primary concerns about plea-bargaining is the risk that innocent
defendants have no real choice but to accept the plea offer. That is magnified by
the practice of some prosecutors to make a plea offer with a very short fuse—in
effect, accept it now or lose it.115 Imagine an innocent defendant’s dilemma in a
case in which the prosecutor has charged the defendant with crimes that may
result in many years in prison. A New Yorker article offered a chilling

105. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749.
106. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(c)(6), 1170.12 (a)(6) (2016).
107. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749–50.
108. See, e.g., Michael Vitiello, California’s Three Strikes and We’re Out: Was Judicial Activism
California’s Best Hope?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1025 (2004); Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return
to Rationality, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395 (1997).
109. Eric Slater, Pizza Thief Receives Sentence of 25 Years to Life in Prison: Crime: Judge Cites Five
Prior Felony Convictions in Sentencing Jerry Dewayne Williams Under ‘Three Strikes’ Law, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
3, 1995, at 9B.
110. People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628, 647 (Cal. 1996).
111. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 948 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1998).
112. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
113. Id. at 52–54.
114. Dripps, supra note 63, at 8.
115. Mike Work, Creating Constitutional Procedure: Frye, Lafler, and Plea Bargaining Reform, 104 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 457, 481 (2014).
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description of the realities that jailed offenders face in big-city courts.116 Innocent
offenders who cannot make bail have few options other than pleading guilty.
Conditions in jail are oppressive and the consequences of staying in jail are
devastating.117 Any hopes of retaining employment are lost.118 Meanwhile,
pleading guilty leaves an offender open to numerous collateral consequences,
often leading to disastrous results.119 Determining how often innocent offenders
are convicted is tricky. But some scholars estimate the rate is somewhere
between 2.3–5% of offenders.120 With that in mind, imagine how you would
advise your client faced with continued incarceration and a trial down the road
somewhere in a clogged system or taking a plea and being released for timeserved. Assume that you are the public defender with far too many cases to
handle other than through bargains. Do you have time to assess your client’s
claim of innocence? At the end of the day, more than nine times out of ten, you
will advise the client to take the plea.
Imagine other cases. Assume a client and victim engaged in a bar fight,
resulting in the death of the victim. If offered a plea of a short term of years,
should your client accept it or go to trial to interpose a plausible self-defense
claim? Or consider a conversation I had with a woman who called me seeking
someone to represent her son in a rape trial. The case would turn on conflicting
testimony about consent. And if the woman’s son went to trial, in addition to a
term of imprisonment, he would face a lifetime as a registered sex offender.
The choices faced by defendants have the look and feel of coercion; but no
court today is likely to so rule.121 Occasionally, writers suggest reforms to the
system.122 But few suggestions have much hope of succeeding because our
criminal justice system is addicted to guilty pleas.123 Even a reduction in pleas
from 90% to 80% would mean that twice as many cases that go to trial today

116. Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014), available at http://www.
newyorker. com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law (on file at The University of the Pacific Law Review).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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120. INNOCENCE PROJECT, How Many Innocent People Are There in Prison?, http://www.Innocence
project.org/faqs/how-many-innocent-people-are-there-in-prison (last visited Apr. 6, 2016) (on file with The
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121. See, e.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the Justice
System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63 (2011).
122. See, e.g., Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV
439 (1971).
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would go to trial.124 Many court systems, like California, faced budget cuts
during the recession—funds that the state has not fully restored.125
Criminal trials are a staple of TV shows.126 Often, offenders have resources
to hire top-notch lawyers who secure acquittals in close cases.127 But, in effect,
those cases are a show about what our system can provide. Despite high hopes
during the Warren Court era, when the Court found that the states have an
obligation to provide indigent offenders with competent counsel, that promise is
still largely unfulfilled. The result is bargained-for-justice where one side has few
chips to play.128
IV. BARGAINED-FOR-JUSTICE IN ITALY
In 1988, the Italian Parliament revised its Code of Criminal Procedure to
move Italy from an inquisitorial to an adversarial system.129 As indicated above,
during the post-World War II era, European systems adopted some of the basic
rights guaranteed in the United States Constitution.130 At times, the motivation
has come from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).131 The Italian
Parliament’s adoption of its form of adversarial justice resulted in part from the
ECHR’s finding that Italy failed to provide defendants with speedy trials.132 As
occurred elsewhere, the Italians increased criminalization, leading to systemic
inefficiency.133
In addition, Italy was going through a significant change, as were many
European countries. Inquisitorial justice reflects a societal belief that the state is
legitimate and acts in the interest of its citizens.134 By comparison, the rights
model in the United States is grounded in the belief that government needs to be
restrained.135 A quick look at protections in the Bill of Rights establishes that
point. Many of those protections have little or nothing to do with improving the
124. See id.
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fact-finding function of a trial.136 The Fourth Amendment frustrates the finding of
truth when the court suppresses what is likely the most probative evidence of
guilt.137 The Fifth Amendment—to be free from compelled testimony—often
results in disqualifying the person with the most relevant information from
testifying in court.138 Our system aims for a sense of procedural fairness; that is,
our system gives a defendant a fighting chance against the powerful state.139
One of the lessons of World War II was that Europeans, especially citizens of
Germany and Italy, could not rely on a beneficent state.140 Authoritarianism was
illegitimate.141 One of the reforms was to include a form of bargained-forjustice.142 Not surprisingly, many participants in the Italian system were slow to
adapt to the changes in the law. Part of the problem was fundamental: lawyers
trained in the civil law inquisitorial justice system reject plea-bargaining.143
Among the civil law values in conflict with plea bargaining, are some important
principles: a prosecutor has a mandate to pursue all crimes where the prosecutor
has sufficient evidence that a crime has taken place144; the justice system
presumes the defendant innocent and has the responsibility to prove the
defendant’s guilt145; and, consistent with the principle of legality, the state cannot
impose punishment on a defendant absent a trial on the merits.146 In addition, the
principle of just and proportional punishment suggests that a court must
determine a sentence based on a defendant’s conduct. The effect of a plea
agreement is to lessen the punishment; that is, when a judge sentences an
offender consistent with a plea bargain, the judge is not sentencing consistent
with the law only.147
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Italian courts issued a number of decisions that undercut the procedural
reforms.148 In 1999 and then again in 2001, the Italian Parliament returned to the
subject of procedural reforms, eventually amending the Italian Constitution.149 It
now states that a defendant may renounce various rights the defendant loses
when she pleads guilty.150
Current law in Italy permits a form of bargaining called patteggiamento,
which means “the application of punishment upon the request of the parties.”151
Updated in 2005, the law limited the offenses that are within the law. Bargaining
is available for offenses that carry a sentence of up to seven and a half years in
prison.152 The law excludes certain crimes, including organized crime offenses
and sexual crimes, from the list of offenses subject to bargaining.153 The Italian
Parliament also excluded certain habitual offenders from plea-bargaining.154
Bargaining takes a different form than bargaining in the United States. In the
United States, prosecutors and defendants can enter a bargain without regard to
the offense. The parties may enter a bargain, even in a first-degree murder case,
where a defendant may avoid the death penalty by pleading guilty to the crime
with a promise that the prosecutor will support a sentence other than the death
sentence.155 Alternatively, the parties may agree that the prosecutor will reduce
the crime charged from first-degree to second-degree murder or to voluntary
manslaughter, as a way to assure a lesser sentence.156 One of the unhealthy
effects of the ability of a prosecutor to reduce charges is the tendency to
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overcharge offenders.157 Italy has, in effect, legislated in a way that reduces
prosecutorial discretion.
Unlike in the American system, an Italian prosecutor is unable to drop a
charge because of the principle of mandatory prosecution, which is in the Italian
constitution.158 A prosecutor cannot drop charges against the defendant; a judge
must determine if dropping the charge is warranted.159 The bargaining system
that does exist allows a defendant to ask for a particular reduced sentence and
does not require the defendant to enter a plea of guilty.160 The Italian system
gives the defendant greater protection than what is available in the United States.
If a prosecutor refuses a defendant’s request for a particular sentence, the
prosecutor must explain the decision to the defendant.161 If the defendant
disagrees with the prosecutor’s reasons, the defendant may ask the judge for
review of the prosecutor’s explanation.162 Further, even if the parties have agreed
to a particular sentence, the judge must verify whether the defendant’s request
was voluntary.163 The judge must also review the facts, including mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, to determine if the bargain corresponds to the facts.164
The Italian system includes other advantages for a defendant who bargains
for a reduced sentence. Some of those are not unique. For example, a defendant’s
plea is not given issue preclusive effect in related civil proceedings.165 While that
is not the case in the United States when a defendant pleads guilty, many states
allow a plea of nolo contendere, which has the same procedural effect as the plea
in the Italian system.166 The Italian system makes offenders eligible to have their
records expunged after a period of years.167 Some states in the United States
allow expungement, but they do so under more restrictive conditions than in
Italy.168 In the United States, an offender must commence a new proceeding to
move for expungement; the process is far more burdensome than in Italy, where
the right to expungement is in the law authorizing bargaining.169
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Another way to think about the bargained-for-justice system in Italy is to see
the abiding influence of “the Continental mentality.”170 As a University of Trento
graduate student wrote, “irrespective of any attempt to transplant an adversarial
model, [the Italian system] is at pains to accept that judges play no role in the
search for truth and that [the] parties shape the criminal outcome.”171
Initially, plea-bargaining did not seem to take hold in Italy. For example, in
2004, 85% of all criminal cases still went to trial.172 But by 2012, bargaining
seemed to have taken root: in that year, 34% of all criminal cases involved
bargained-for-justice.173
V. LESSONS LEARNED
No doubt, the ECHR had ample evidence that the Italian system crawled too
slowly, thereby depriving defendants of their right to speedy trials. After a
sluggish start, Italian lawyers and judges are learning to accept bargained-forjustice. But is that something to celebrate?
That depends. Insofar as the Italian system provides defendants with speedy
trials, the reforms to the Italian system are a success. But rapidly increasing rates
of cases that the parties resolve through bargaining raises questions. I have not
observed the Italian system in action and have not found scholarly accounts of
how bargaining works on the ground in Italy. At least as drafted, Italian law
continues important guarantees that prevent abusive prosecutorial overreaching.
Prosecutors must explain their reasons for refusing bargains—decisions that
judges must review. In theory, that is an important check on abuse. Jurisdictions
in the United States provide far fewer checks on plea-bargaining.
That takes me to my final point: too often, Americans are ignorant about the
basics of alternative judicial systems. Often, when Americans and even some
scholars discuss foreign systems, they demonstrate a singular lack of
understanding of how those systems work. Sadly, when some members of the
Supreme Court talk about foreign law, they enflame American prejudice. In
response to Justice Kennedy’s citation to European law, the late-Justice Scalia
railed that such a citation was “meaningless dicta” and “dangerous.”174 During a
discussion at the American University Washington College of Law, Justice
Scalia said, “ . . . we don’t have the same moral and legal framework as the rest
of the world, and never have.”175 At a minimum, Justice Scalia demonstrated a
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remarkable lack of curiosity about the larger world; worse, his remarks seem to
demonstrate an arrogance about the American system. Other members of the
Court’s rightwing have expressed similar indifference to international law.176
And yet, we have a lot to learn from foreign systems. Bargained-for-justice
in the United States has degraded our system with an intolerable risk of coercing
innocent defendants into accepting plea bargains. Further, our system allows little
light into the bases for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion; and at least,
viewed in gross terms, the system seems rigged against indigent minority
defendants. Before the Italians go further down the path of bargained-for-justice,
would this be a good time for us to emulate some of Italy’s restraints on
bargained-for-justice?
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